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Abstract
The policy-making and distributive effects of lobbying is a disturbing 
and highly debated issue in many developing countries. This study will 
provide a comparative analysis of the two biggest industrial-commer-
cial interest groups in Turkey. The relationship between the policy sug-
gestions of TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association), 
and MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Associa-
tion) and economic policies implemented both at micro and macro level 
afterthe 1990’s has been placed under great scrutiny. In this paper, an 
overview of the positive theory of regulation along with the theory of 
collective action is provided in order to highlight the main discussions 
covered in existing literature. This paper claims that these two interest 
groups have conflicting incentives in terms of the regulatory process, 
arising from the characteristics of their members. Such a situation leads 
to a struggle to exert influence on governmental policies from which one 
group benefits, while the other is hurt. The model, adapted from Becker 
(1983) and partly Olson (1982) and later modified is an attempt to 
arrive at the optimum level of regulation which favors policies ben-
eficial for each party. A general theory of lobbying and interest-groups 
in developing countries and specifically Turkey will therefore constitute 
the theoretical underpinning of this work while the absence of in-depth 
numeral indicators for the interest groups’ lobbying power dictates that 
descriptive statistics play an important role. This study will aim at 
searching out the exact cost and benefit for the groups involved as well 
as additional hidden factors that might incorporate explanatory power 
in understanding the relevant dynamics in the case of Turkey.
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est-group, Protectionism, Government Regulation.
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Introduction
The relationship between lobbying and regulation policies has been 
long debated, however usually from a political standpoint. In its usual 
sense, the theory of interest groups refers to the political participation and 
the lobbying effects of the above on policy and decision making. Also true 
for the developing countries like Turkey, is a presumed strong relationship 
between the interests of lobbying groups and governmental policies. This 
paper,however, is an attempt to address such a relation in terms of eco-
nomic policies, with particular focus on regulation or deregulation, based 
on Turkish experience, especially in the aftermath of the ‘80s. Becker’s 
(1983) model on the theory of competition among pressure groups in their 
strugglefor political influence will constitute a theoretical groundwork for 
the discussion. The second section is intended to provide a literature review 
on the theory of regulation and lobbying, which begins with the ‘transac-
tions cost’ approach introduced by Coase (1960). In the third section, the 
likelihood of regulation in favor or against one of the two pressure groups 
in the case of Turkey will be pointed out in line with Becker’s (1983) 
theoretical framework. Based on the available data however, our simple 
analysis will cover only 2007, and to a partial extent, 2011 figures. The 
section concludes the analysis of positive theories of regulation based on 
the Turkish experience, providing evidence supportive of Olson’s (1982) 
theory of interest-groups with critical exceptions in the case of Turkey. 
The last section will provide concluding remarks on how well the Turk-
ish experience fits with positive theories of regulation, based on lobbying 
influences on policy making and government decisions.
The theory of interest-groups is closely and foremost associated 
with the institutional and therefore the governmental base in a country. 
The regulative interventions in the business world are best observed in 
the formulation of economic policies. Therefore the problem of regulation 
and market effectiveness occupies a central position in the process since 
the degree of interventionist policies often leads to a growth in lobbying 
activities. Regardingthe government’s position, Coase (1960) proposes a 
market pricing mechanism (highest bidder rule, in most of the cases) to 
ensure self-regulation. He asserts that employing price mechanisms would 
allocate resources to users without the need for government regulation. 
He proposes the creation of well-defined property rights in order to avoid 
market failures. In order to increase the competition in such sectors he 
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says, there should be some limitations supplied by property rights organi-
zations. As he again includes the costs of market operations in his analysis, 
Coase (1960) states if those were too high to make transactions then there 
should be some misallocation of resources by a regulatory organ. One im-
portant result he derives is that implementation of property rights would 
be much easier and less costly whenever the size of the population increas-
es to make transactions possible and/or limit the excess of economic rents 
involved. In this light, he gives the example of users of the broadcasting 
industry since they use a small proportion of “spectrum space”. He argues 
that governmental departments will also be forced to use resources in a 
more efficient way since they will have to pay for the service they use in a 
freely-operating price mechanism. Such a pricing mechanism would allow 
positive revenues to flow to the government. 
Becker (1983) discusses the most efficient way of regulation under 
the competition of pressure groups possessing lobbying power, in line with 
Coase’s (1960) arguments. Given the fact that most efficiently organized 
and small-sized groups possess more power in terms of lobbying and ac-
quire certain privileges at the expense of the other groups, Becker’s (1983) 
argument fits well into what Coase (1960) had previously described as the 
‘lowest transactions cost’. The least distortionary scheme of tax-subsidy 
equilibrium would be most preferential for the government to implement. 
Before concluding our arguments concerning this paper’s focus, we should 
however note that Grossman and Helpman (1994 and 2002) argue re-
garding the trade policies that the government might choose a non-distor-
tionary way by ensuring direct transfers of funds to one group. Their works 
and a consequent vast body of literature constitute another line of research 
focusing on the game-theoretical explanation of trade policy-making 
based on protectionist lobbies and their relations with voting behaviors. 
The case of the Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association (hereafter, 
TUSIAD) and The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Asso-
ciation (hereafter, MUSIAD) seems to best fit into Becker’s (1983) theory 
of competition among pressure groups for political influence although 
there are some missing elements in satisfactorily explaining the Turkish 
experience. The very reason that these two business associations are sub-
ject to comparative analysis is that they represent pure non-governmental 
capitalist motives with different interests from the outcomes of economic 
policies. Since, TUSIAD is proposed to be the more effective,although 
constituting a smaller size group while MUSIAD represents the second, 
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the paper will be assumed to draw the conclusion that TUSIAD –given its 
number of members and their sizes- exerts more influence on government 
policies compared to that of MUSIAD’s. It is however quite contrary to 
the theory of collective action as well as Becker’s model to observe that 
MUSIAD’s has consistently been gaining more and more influence almost 
on every level of policy-making institutions while TUSIAD’s initial ad-
vantage has beendiminishing over time. Such a result could best be derived 
by the insertion of the motivation element into the model. The younger 
and more innovative the MUSIAD members are, the more devotion to 
their common interests seems to be created.
Literature Review
Positive Theories of Lobbying and Regulation
Government should only intervene in so as to provide low costs of 
transactions in the market according to Coase (1960). Depending on the 
government would allow the political influences to get involved in the 
regulation process. At this point, Coase refers to a mixture of transferable 
rights plus regulation. He treats intangible goods in the same way as tan-
gible ones like land, labor or capital. Coase (1960) can be said to assume 
a positive and empirical position in the argument since he regards the 
economic implications of transactions and regulation process as the core 
point in his analysis through his use of empirical examples of court deci-
sions, thus rendering his position extremely clear. 
Stigler (1971) examines the demand and supply of regulation and 
cost/benefit analysis regarding the industry. One of the favors that the 
regulatory body can do for the industry is provide limitation on market 
entry which Kahn (1988) also describes as one of the conditions for hav-
ing a regulated industry. Here, according to Stigler (1971) political ben-
efits and limits come into play. Political decisions do not necessarily reflect 
the position of the majority of voters even though politicians at times have 
to maximize the votes subject to the constraint of total economic rents 
to be redistributed. He mentions the information, education and most 
importantly the organization costs for the lobbying group and, seen as a 
whole, the cost of gaining interest from regulation. Stigler (1971) treats 
political parties as natural monopolies through which regulatory decisions 
are given. Stigler’s (1971) analysis places much emphasis on the relative 
group size. 
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Following the same line, Posner (1974) stresses the need for mini-
mizing the opportunity cost stemming from the pressure groups’ efforts 
to gain monopoly power while indicating the social welfare losses from 
a natural monopoly. After making a summary of Stigler’s (1971) analy-
sis, Peltzman (1976) states that the lower the group size, the greater the 
amount per member gained from lobbying and the higher the likelihood 
to obtain regulatory/deregulatory favors. Now the regulator’s choice is not 
limited to the interest group size only but also the cost/benefit structure 
to be selected. If the consumer groups are large in size and inelastic in de-
mand, then most likely the winning group will be the firms. In this sense, 
the political party should increase its probability of support from these 
competing groups. As the lobbying becomes less costly by implement-
ing advanced means of technology, then the amount of tax to be imposed 
could become smaller. Thus, this will make the amount to be redistributed 
smaller as well. The amount of profit that is generated by regulation should 
remain in equilibrium with the majority’s tax payments.
Coase (1960) advocated his property rights argument on the basis 
of the problem of efficient allocation and the inefficiency arising from 
government regulation in any industry. Starting with the analysis of dead-
weight loss from transfers made, Becker (1983) already treats the transac-
tions non-costless. Coase (1960) therefore could be regarded as the men-
tor of Becker’s (1983) model regarding the optimal cost of transfers to be 
possible. If the deadweight loss from the transfer is higher than the rela-
tive gains from the transaction as a whole, this transfer is then unlikely to 
occur. One similar point in both Coase (1960) and Becker’s (1983) argu-
ments is the marginal principle which implies the marginal impact of the 
expenditures on pressure to be greater than zero. The greater the pressure 
group size, the less effective the expenditure on lobbying since the amount 
increases significantly after a certain threshold. Per unit expenditure of a 
pressure group affects the amount of the aggregate amount to be redistrib-
uted in a positive direction. However this raises the amount of tax to be 
raised thus increasing the deadweight costs. 
According to Becker’s (1983) model; if the deadweight costs in-
crease, then the equilibrium level of subsidy decreases. So, this implies 
that on a wide range of policies, those with lowest DW costs are more 
likely in equilibrium. Equilibrium implies that there is no less costlier way 
of transfers which is a result that Coase (1960) derives under the initial 
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delimitation of property rights and an analysis of freely-operating price 
mechanism conditions. One important result Becker (1983) shows is that 
the successful groups tend to be the small ones, implying the lower costs 
of organization and other procedures. As a conclusion, both Coase (1960) 
and Becker (1983) arrive at the result that an efficient pricing mecha-
nism will generate an optimal equilibrium condition in which the costs 
are minimized and regardless of the initial condition, the allocation of re-
sources will be the same because of efficient bargaining and organizational 
structures. However, the well-defined property rights should be created on 
a sound basis first.
The Political Economy of Lobbying
The theory of collective action provides intuitive methodology to ap-
proach the issue of public goods and externalities not only in tangible ones 
(i.e. pollution) but also abstract ones (i.e. tariff rates). The general incentive 
to ‘free ride’ is first analyzed by Olson (1965) and Hardin (1968). Factors 
such as group size, age, homogeneity and purpose are determinants of suc-
cess in Olson’s (1965, 1982) works that in turn yields the desired result in 
terms of policy-making via lobbying. Hardin (1968) on the other hand 
discusses the “tragedy of commons” in which he assesses the overuse or 
congestion in the use of public goods, creating problems in the absence of 
well-structured property rights. The neoclassical (and to an extent the new 
institutional economics’) theories on the formation of groups to eliminate 
potential free-riding issues and provide efficient monitoring have evolved 
over time to create a vast body of literature on the effects of pressure groups 
in gaining political power. Needless to say, the policy-making institutions 
are operating in such an environment shaped by the type, number and the 
size of such organized groups, to some extent as least.
The emergence of political, economic or other social action groups 
deserves a multi-dimensional approach for analysis since it has simultane-
ously micro and macro foundations. In an effort to understand the forma-
tion process and the structure of interest groups, Olson’s (1965) pioneering 
work; The Logic of Collective Action should be counted with Buchanan’s 
(1965) leading paper on the Economic Theory of Clubs in order to provide 
some insight at structural level. In his dissertation thesis, Olson (1965) 
makes use of the basic postulates for individual action that presume self-
interest maximizing behavior while answering the question of interest 
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group structures in a society. Accordingly, a successful and prolonged in-
terest group should be smaller in size yielding a positive gain for its mem-
bers that permit the group actions to create an average level of benefits ex-
ceeding the costs. The problem of ‘free-riding’ however may emerge under 
the condition that there is no selective incentive. The larger the group size, 
the more the number of “free-riders”, implies the theory. This is mostly 
due to the misalignment of interests among the group members and the 
very trivial share of average benefit to the members in a very large group. 
Therefore, Olson (1982) argues that the smaller the group size, the more 
effective and successful the lobbying activity. The same is argued within 
the ‘theory of clubs’, introduced by Buchanan (1965), who puts forward 
the conclusion that given the set of adjustable property rights, the optimal 
group size tends to be smaller when the average real income increases. 
Such a mechanism however would only work if the goods provided by 
the group (i.e. privileges) are considered as exclusive in order to avoid 
the “free-rider” problem seen as very common in public good provision. 
Selective incentives, as Olson (1982) puts it are not always positive but 
sometimes occur at negative margins such as being excluded from the 
“club”. Therefore, looking at the situation as a whole, there are five basic 
conditions for the formation and success of an interest group, according to 
Olson’s (1982) theory:
i) Positive gains from lobbying
ii) Existence of selective incentives
iii) Exclusive goods (i.e. perfect market information on the specific 
good) that create negative and/or positive externalities
iv) Homogeneity of the group members/ alignment of interests
v) Existence of a property rights regime or the low cost of bargaining 
for collective action
Olson’s (1965, 1982); Buchanan’s (1965); Peltzman (1976) and 
Becker’s (1983) arguments all point to the theoretical fact that the smaller 
the size of and the bigger the net benefit to the pressure group, the more 
incentive that the individual has in joining and contributing to the group. 
Olson’s interest-group formation mechanism is briefly included here:
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 C=ƒ(T) where (C) is the cost of collective action as a function of 
the level (T) at which the good is provided. Vg=TSg where Vg represents 
the value of the good to the group; while Sg is the “size” therefore number 
of the members of the group Vi value of the good to individual iwhile Fi=vi 
/ vg is the fraction. Ai = Vi - C where Ai is the net benefit to the individual 
that depends on the level of individual expenditure.
dAi / d T = dVi / dT-dC ⁄ dT
Under the maximization assumptions, first-order conditions should 
yield the following: 
dAi  ⁄ dT = 0 
Since Vi = FiSgT, while Fi and Sg are constants. Replacing Vi into 
the preceding equation yields the following:
                  
Therefore, the smaller the individual share, Fi ,the less the individual 
is eager to take part in the group as the average benefit gets smaller while 
the group size increases.
Olson (1982) argues that there will be no countries that attain sym-
metrical organization of all groups sharing a common interest and thereby 
attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining. Relatively 
more stable countries will tend to create more organizations for collective 
action over time while members of ‘small’ groups have incredibly higher 
organizational power, lowering the costs while that power is likely to di-
minish over time. And last but not least, he argues that the emergence and 
persistence of such interest groups overall reduces efficiency and aggregate 
income in the society since they are divisive in nature. Two basic points 
that both Tullock (1983) and North (1983) pay attention to are: the test-
ing and refutability of Olson’s theoretical and semi-empirical conclusions 
in a wider range of countries; and the position of ‘statecraft’ as the main 
interest group.
As Olson (1982) states, the theories of the extent to which social 
classes and rigidities are effective for relative growth are debatable and the 
empirical facts vary over time and country whether they are in line with 
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the theories or not. The possibility of multi-causal cases is yet another con-
cern regarding the relationship between growth and interest groups. Last 
but not least, the problem of testing is important as multi-casual diversity 
may imply the same empirical result while concealing different reason-
ing and interpretations. Murphy et al. (1991) however provide a differ-
ent perspective on how easy a rent-seeking society could develop interest 
groups; and conclude that rent-seeking activity is subject to very natural 
increasing returns, thus having more returns at higher levels. Accordingly, 
it could afflict innovative activity in the society and therefore hinder eco-
nomic growth.
Providing a business perspective on the issue, in another work fo-
cusing on East Asian countries, Doner and Schneider (2000) find that 
business associations contribute to economic growth in several ways such 
as macroeconomic stabilization and reform; horizontal coordination (like 
quota allocation and capacity reduction); vertical coordination (upstream-
downstream); lowering information costs; setting standards and quality 
upgrading. According to their study, business groups contribute to the 
economy mainly or under certain conditions solely by pursuing their own 
interests. Two broad categories of contribution are described as ‘market-
supporting’ and ‘market complementing’ activities in the sense of inter-
est groups’ contribution. Doner and Schneider (2000) conclude that the 
well-functioning and contributing interest groups are the ones with higher 
member densities; those that provide valuable resources to their members 
and have adequate internal mechanisms for mediating member interests.
Mork’s (1993) argument on the impact of lobbyists however may 
even be positive compared to the non-lobbyist case. His basic intuition is 
that the growth rate would be higher in the case of lobbying compared to 
the situation where lobbying activities are strictly banned such as in the 
case of former-Soviet countries. In line with Olson’s (1982) arguments, 
Mork (1993) notes that lobbying activities have bigger marginal effects at 
lower levels (i.e. # of the groups) and are subject to diminishing returns 
over time. Murphy et al. (1991) however provide a different perspective on 
how easily a rent-seeking society could develop interest groups and con-
clude that rent-seeking activity is subject to very natural increasing returns 
thus rendering greater returns at higher levels and second could inhibit 
innovative activity in the society and therefore hinder economic growth. 
Maitland (1985) on the other hand concludes that Olson’s (1982) theory 
tested by the effects of business and labor groups is empirically true under 
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relevant circumstances such as the higher correlation between the overall 
direction of the group and the members’ incentives.
Lobbying and Regulation: Picturing Turkey’s Experience
In all the positive theories of regulation introduced by Stigler (1971), 
Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983), the gap between the regulatory de-
cisive bodies and the economic implementations is seemingly filled in the 
example of the developed country, for example, the US. The important 
factor that is seemingly absent in Kahn’s (1988) analysis for instance is 
the political incentives and decisions of the regulatory organs in the gov-
ernment. The questions, rather than economic, are almost all political al-
though economically driven. The amount of regulation, the firms’ costs 
and/or benefits from the regulation, the impact on consumers and the 
whole society and the political influence between groups are important 
factors determining the resulted equilibrium in the economy since regula-
tion indirectly means a transfer of resources. 
The political decision should create equilibrium at the lowest dead-
weight cost of transfers. This argument comes from Becker (1983) which is 
consistent with Kahn’s (1988) arguments that if regulation that maintains 
the natural monopoly is less efficient and much costlier, then we should 
simply employ competition and market price mechanisms. To conclude, it 
may be asserted that the positive theories of regulation introduced by all 
there economists and the empirical evidence provided by Kahn (1988) fit 
just as well and fill the normative decisive unit in the analysis. The political 
organization is unique in the sense of whether it creates or not a natural 
monopoly regarding both decision and regulation processes. The competi-
tion to acquire the benefits of regulation should create an optimal equilib-
rium of total welfare for the whole society. The need for regulation should 
be analyzed in details taking the product itself (i.e. the “nature”) into ac-
count, the industry’s conditions and the consumers’ benefits. The environ-
ment that creates the institutions that acquire a certain degree of lobbying 
power over time should also be a major question as Persson (1998) puts 
it regarding the possible suggestions of diluting the roles of such institu-
tions: “why do we observe these particular institutions?” 
Turkish experience of business lobbying groups has not been that 
much subject to either theoretical or empirical analysis, as much of the 
literature on lobbying and regulation suggests so far. Therefore, this study 
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constitutes an attempt to apply Becker’s (1983) theory of interest groups 
and his model to Turkish pressure groups (if so) which exert a significant 
effect on industrial and thus development policies. The model adapted 
from Becker (1983) is therefore intended to provide an analytical frame-
work in conflicting interests in terms of regulation and economic incen-
tives by government. Such a framework implies that one interest group 
takes advantage of certain economic liberalization policies at the expense 
of the other, under the assumption that the members of each group dif-
ferentiate in size, production scale, export or domestic orientation etc. 
MUSIAD and TUSIAD, for instance, depart from each other at 
micro level while the two move together towards less regulation overall. 
TUSIAD favors policies that ease the obstacles which foreign investors 
and financial agents face in their decision-making processes, as their over-
riding priority, while MUSIAD favors policies that helpaccountability, 
managerial skills and financial issues of smaller entrepreneurs. The paper 
thus focuses on TUSIAD and MUSIAD, and effectively divides these two 
interest groups (or lobbying powers) in terms of their members’ incen-
tives and attempts to build up a theoretical framework to describe the 
misalignment of interests and struggle for influence at the political level. 
The contrast between the two associations is clear enough that the focus 
of our study can easily be justified. According to Öniş and Türem (2001) 
for instance, TUSIAD represents relatively bigger industrialists and con-
glomerates while MUSIAD heavily represents small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The first is highly concentrated in Istanbul, the commer-
cial and financial capital of Turkey, while the latter is dispersed over the 
whole country. Despite the higher number of members, MUSIAD reflects 
around 10% of the total GDP (approx. 15% as of 2011), while TUSIAD 
members produce around 50% of gross national income.
 Even a simple analysis should indicate first that TUSIAD differs 
from MUSIAD in many ways, including its position on regulation over 
time. As Shambayati (1994) puts it correctly, during the formation pro-
cess of a ‘renter state’ in Turkey, TUSIAD was in favor of strong regula-
tory bodies incorporated in the statecraft. Over most of the 1970s, after 
its foundation in 1971, TUSIAD members enjoyed high surpluses cre-
ated by protectionist policies, such as exchange rate or import restrictions. 
However, that situation began to change gradually following the new wave 
of deregulation in the emerging economies after the ‘80sin line with the 
general tendency of the last three decades. The report on the economic 
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development of Turkey, published by TUSIAD and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2005a) for instance, starts 
with the statement that weak regulatory systems are preferable for strong 
economic growth [pp. 13]. Again TUSIAD (2005b) regards weak eco-
nomic regulation and small governmental involvement in economic activ-
ity as key factors leading to higher growth rates. For instance, in theUS, 
the share of industries under government regulation decreased from 17% 
in 1977 to 6.6% in 1988 which had also seen a period of rapid economic 
growth (TUSIAD, 2005a:32-34). Therefore, certain interest groups, such 
as TUSIAD and MUSIAD are in theory said to favor positive or limited 
regulation, in line with the theory. 
Becker’s (1983) model for the theory of competition among pressure 
groups will be used to provide some ground for lobbying effectiveness, 
with some modifications however. Assuming only two homogenousgroups 
in society, with t used (for TUSIAD members) and m (for MUSIAD 
members), the redistribution mechanism leads to following allocations 
(resources away from t and redistribution to each m):
Z0’s indicate per agent income levels prior to transfer, while Z’s im-
ply the levels of per agent incomeafter transfer. In such a context, all po-
litical activities (i.e. developmental incentives and policies) that raise the 
income of a group are considered as a subsidy, and all activities that lower 
incomes is regarded as a tax. The amount raised by all taxes on the group t 
can be written as follows:
Where      is the number of members of t, and      is the taxes paid 
by each member.
Where                                                  when taxes do not distort 
income, meaning “lump sum” taxation. 
where,       is the number of members and        is the subsidy to each 
member. Gis the cost of providing         and incorporates the dead-weight 
costs from the distorting effects of subsidies on hours worked, investments, 
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
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and other choices by recipients. Properties of G are:
Following the same logic above,                                  and G = 0 
when subsidies do not distort; or put differently, are “lump sum”. Equation 
(4) gives the budget constraint of amount paid in taxes and the amount 
received as subsidies.
The amount t which is collected as taxes is determined by an influ-
ence function that depends on the pressure (p) exerted by m and t and 
other variables (x):
                                          and by the same token:
 
Equation (4) obviously implies that these two functions are depen-
dent which yields a zero sum of the tax revenues and the amount spent for 
the subsidies:
Differentiating equation (8) by any other variable y gives:
Therefore, when increased pressure by t raises its influence (and 
thereby lowers its taxes), increased pressure by t would lower the influence 
(and subsidy) of m:  
Based on the fact that, one should also note that if any change in 
characteristics of a group, such as the occupation or ages of members hap-
pens to raise its influence, these characteristics would serve to lower the 
influence of the other group. Based on the simple characteristics of the 
above model adapted from Becker (1983), we will now present basic facts 
on the two business groups, TUSIAD and MUSIAD.
As of December 2007, TUSIAD, Turkey’s largest private business 
group in terms of economic value, has 576 members. The membership 
scheme exhibits a composition of owners and managers of individual 
firms, group companies and holding companies operating in the Turkish 
manufacturing and service sectors. The number of companies, represented 
(5)
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by these members, totaled approximately 1300 by the year 2007. In its 
own words, the companies represented by TUSIAD’s membership occupy 
prominent positions in the Turkish economy. According to TUSIAD’s 
2007 membership profile, member companies’ total sales volume is around 
USD 156.1bn. This sales volume amounts to USD 68.7bn of value added. 
The number of people employed in those companies reaches 626,000. Ac-
cording to its own figures, TUSIAD members produce 37.6% of Turkey’s 
value- added, in the industry, financial and the construction sector.
The volume of exports and imports generated by TUSIAD mem-
bers is 47.7 billion US dollars and USD 44.4 billion dollars, respectively. 
As of 2007 TUSIAD members generate 44.5% of Turkish exports and 
26.1% of Turkish imports in terms of goods and services. Below, sectoral 
decomposition of the members is provided, given the industries that each 
representative member is placed in accordance withthe companies’ fields 
of operation:
Sector Number of Members (w/ duplicates)
Ads-Publishing 27
Finance 107
Energy 67
Construction 97
Textiles 79
Packaging 14
Metals 59
Automotive 45
Machinery 27
Mechanical app 17
Electrical app 30
Food 69
Durable goods 24
Furniture 17
Service 144
IT 36
Chemicals 39
Chemistry 15
Health 33
TOTAL 946
Table 1. TUSIAD Members’ Sectoral Distribution, 2007
Source: Own surveys findings
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Source: Official data
Table 2. TUSIAD’s Contribution to the Turkish Economy, 2007 
Production
 (USD bn)  2004 2005 2006 2007
sales 
revenue 
value 
added*  
sales 
revenue  
value 
added*  
sales 
revenue  
value 
added*  
sales 
revenue  
value 
added*  
 TUSIAD   (1)  94.1 41.4 97.3 42.8 114 50.2 156.1 68.7
 Total of Sectoral Value 
Added**  (2) 110.4 133.2 147.1 182.6
 Share of TUSIAD  (1/2) 37.5 32.1 34.1 37.6
* The long-term value added 
value is assumed to be 44% 
in the included sectors 
** The total value added 
of the industry, financial 
institutions and the 
construction sector  
Exports
 (USD bn)  1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
 TUSIAD   (1)  11.8 12.5 13.1 22.2 28.1 35.2 47.7
 Total exports of Turkey   (2) 27 26.6 27.8 63.2 73.5 85.5 107.2
 Share of TUSIAD   (1/2)  43.7 46.8 47.2 35.2 38.2 41.2 44.5
Imports
 (USD bn)  1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
 TUSIAD  7.9 8.9 9.9 19.3 26.7 33.9 44.4
 Total imports of Turkey  -2 45.9 40.7 54.5 97.5 116.8 139.5 170
 Share of TUSIAD   (1/2)  17.2 21.9 18.2 19.8 22.9 24.3 26.1
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TUSIAD has now around 600 members with some 2,500 firms as 
of the year-end figures in 2011. According to the association’s own figures, 
it also produces some 50% of Turkey’s value-added (excluding the public 
sector); makes 65% of the total industrial production; creates around 80% 
of Turkish foreign trade (excluding the energy sector) and employs half of 
the non-public working population. The distribution of TUSIAD member 
companies with respect to their sectors is as follows: 35% manufacturing 
industry, 13% retail, 11% construction, 11% financial intermediaries, 10% 
transportation and 8% other. Some 12% of the companies are operating in 
the agriculture, education, energy and mining sectors.
MUSIAD, on the other hand, assumes the position of the second 
lobbying group with smaller average firm size and higher number of 
firms in total. According to the provisional data gathered from MUSI-
AD sources, there are approximately 3,000 members, representing some 
10,000 firms by 2007.
MUSIAD Member Distribution Number of Companies (by members)
(Sectoral- by MUSIAD definitions)
2007 2011
Chemistry-Metal and Mining 419 518
Construction and Building Materials 824 1088
Durable Consumer Goods and Furniture 366 440
Energy 104 162
Food 445 566
Health 118 128
Impression, Publication, Packing and Advertisement 205 254
Information Technologies 143 199
Machinery and Automotive 433 510
Service (incl. Logistics) 604 991
Textiles and Leather 447 496
Total 4108 5352
Table 3. MUSIAD Members Sectoral Distribution, 2007 and 2011
According to MUSIAD’s own figures however, the number of the 
companies and their sectoral division –as of 2007- are as follows:
Sources: Own findings
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Conclusion
In this paper, the theory of collective action is tested employing the 
case of Turkey via an extended model of Becker (1983) while simultane-
ously introducing Olson’s (1982) insights. The mechanism through which 
Table 4. MUSIAD Members, 2007 and 2011
Table 5. MUSIAD Employment data and Overview, 2007
MUSIAD Member Profile (General) Number of  Companies
Sectoral Distribution
2007 2011
Textiles and Leather 446 496
Construction and Building Materials 813 1088
IT 143 199
Machinery and Automotive 425 510
Chemistry-Metals and Mining 415 518
Energy 101 162
Food 441 566
Publishing Packing Ads 205 254
Service 598 856
Durable Goods and Furniture 361 440
Health 177 128
Logistics - 135
Total 4065 5352
Firm Size Number of Companies Number of Employees
1-10 202 1207
11-50 254 6673
51- 153 34062
Total* 609 41942
*Istanbul branch only
Total Number of Members: 3000
Estimated number of Companies: 10000
MUSIAD Number of Branches: 29 (as of 2007) 33 (as of 2011)
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interest-groups exert pressure on policy-making institutions is proven to 
be fitting for examples such as the US or other developed nations. The 
success of the model in making it fit into the story of a developing country 
such as Turkey becomes questionable on account of the lack of detailed 
data at first. Despite the possible failures in fitting the model into the real 
observations in the developing world, Amelung (1989) for instance argues 
that Olson’s (1982) interest-group model for explaining the choices for 
protectionist policies would better fit into the developing countries’ ex-
perience since the protection benefits small groups of producers against 
large group of consumers. Secondly, he asserts the more democratic the 
political regime becomes in a country, the less relevant the political in-
fluence exerted by small while powerful interest-group organizations be-
comes. Therefore, search for the effects of interest-groups on the political 
institutions and policy-making processes becomes essential for the case of 
Turkey as well.
It is true that the formation of business interest-groups and their 
relations to government decisions in Turkey are studied from a political 
economy standpoint by distinct scholars since late 1980s. Although the 
last three decades of Turkey’s industrialization and outward-oriented de-
velopment process have been subject to in-depth analyzes from different 
perspectives, a positive theory of lobbying and regulation is not that com-
mon. Bugra (1998) for instance compares the two business associations, 
TUSIAD and MUSIAD on the grounds of their representative social 
class and ideologies where she concludes that the latter’s organizational 
structure that allows the members to share experiences as well as increase 
their capacity through the association’s creative activities is bolstering its 
solidarity, especially through the inclusion of Islamic cultural elements. 
Bugra (1998, 2002) suggests that “Islam can act as such a binding force, 
especially because it appears to be consistent with certain trends in global 
production and trade patterns that are emphasized by MUSIAD’s admin-
istration”. She also cites the importance of facilitating the intermediary 
role between the members of MUSIAD and the global business envi-
ronment, technology efficient business techniques and all other means of 
network.
According to Özdemir (2005) on the other hand, MUSIAD’s inter-
action with competitive global markets, especially the ones in Europe has 
enabled the association tobecome more flexible while ethically and profes-
sionally more systematic and successful. Despite its long-term relations 
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with the business world in Europe, TUSIAD has been hesitant to reach 
further markets and sectors for many years. Moreover, Yankaya (2009) re-
fers to MUSIAD as a spillover agent for the Europeanization of Turkish 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s) at the organizational and 
technical levels. Accordingly, the association also helps members to gain 
access to European funds for innovative projects as well as encouraging 
them to open up to foreign markets thus integrating them into the Euro-
pean business world.
As Öniş and Webb (1992) state, despite its longer institutional past 
and experience, TUSIAD has failed to assert influence over economic 
policies and changes after the 1980s, in Turkey. They argue in a sense that 
TUSIAD has always preferred the shortest and easiest way to achieve its 
goals, even though such decisions often contradicted to their long-term 
interests. Most TUSIAD members, previous industrialists in the import-
substitution period during 1970’s, emerged as the principal or leading ex-
porters of the post-1980 period. Therefore, in the absence of no actual 
rival on their racetrack, TUSIAD became the champion of free trade and 
anti-regulative policies (Öniş and Webb, 1992). The emerging MUSIAD 
however has challenged TUSIAD in many ways, most strikingly however 
on the grounds of advocating market-friendly economic policies. The ef-
fectiveness of MUSIAD during the last decade has mainly been a result 
of its political orientation as most political economy analysts would argue. 
There is however a missing part in the story, according to our study. De-
spite all the indicators listed under the Becker (1983) type model suggest 
TUSIAD’s incomparable superiority regarding its lobbying power, the 
“missing” factor being group motivation and promotion of common values 
among group members.
Lobbying and regulation in Turkey therefore needs to be put in a 
theoretical (may be a game theoretic in advanced levels of analysis) frame-
work, before any attempt to enumerate or quantify the relationship be-
tween the two phenomena is to be made. Therefore, taking two of the 
biggest interest groups at the industrial and business world in Turkey, 
TUSIAD and MUSIAD as primary objects of the analysis, this paper 
constitutes a modest proposal of a theoretical input based on Becker’s 
(1983) model. An overview of the positive theory of regulation is provided 
in order to highlight the main discussions in the literature so far. This 
paper claims that these two interest groups have conflicting incentives in 
terms of the deregulatory process, arising from the characteristics of their 
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members. TUSIAD and MUSIAD are also assumed to be complementary 
in terms of their member sizes and fields f operation. The policy option on 
behalf of government therefore is limited so that any choice preferred to 
another is to lead to losses for on association and gain for the other. Such 
a situation leads to a struggle to gain influence over governmental policies 
which one group benefits from while the other is hurt. The model, adapted 
from Becker (1983) is an attempt to reach the optimum level of regula-
tion which favors policies beneficial for each party. This modest attempt 
however needs to be backed by further empirical evidence with several ro-
bustness checks at different periods. The relative growth performances of 
TUSIAD and MUSIAD could not only be reflected via number of mem-
ber companies through years but also by inspection of their sizes in terms 
of annual revenues etc. To sum up, positive theories of interest-groups are 
not always perfect instruments to measure the relative efficiency of rival 
pressure groups. Lobbying power has many dimensions to it, as is evident 
in the case of Turkey where this paper has highlighted two of the biggest 
private business associations, TUSIAD and MUSIAD. Unless those hid-
den dimensions were prevalent, MUSIAD’s raising power as a lobbying 
institution with influence on economic policies could not be understood 
given the application of the positive theory of regulation and interest-
groups in the case of a simple TUSIAD-MUSIAD comparison.
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